Presentations: Ohio State; 2024 FMA Doctoral Student Consortium; 37th Australian Finance and Banking Conference (Zoom); 2024 Colorado Finance Summit Job Market Session; Texas Christian University; University of Pittsburgh; University of Notre Dame; Michigan State University; University of Minnesota; Cornell University; University of Michigan; London Business School; University of Cincinnati; Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK); 8th World Symposium on Investment Research; 20th Early Career Women in Finance Conference; China International Conference in Finance 2026 (CICF); University of Rochester (Scheduled)
Full abstract
Prior studies focus on how investors' sustainability preferences incentivize firms to reallocate resources from dirty to clean physical capital. However, the impact of investors' preferences on capital allocation depends critically on whether clean capital and dirty capital are substitutable. I develop a novel empirical strategy showing that dirty capital and clean capital are highly complementary. Theoretically, I explore firms' investment decisions, assuming that investors dislike carbon emissions through both risk and nonpecuniary utility channels. Given the current level of complementarity, investors' preferences have a limited impact on investment decisions, underscoring the need for technological innovation to address this production friction.
Each disaster informs lenders about which firms are resilient, yet credit booms recur. This paper studies how learning about disaster risk and the borrowing externality affect credit spreads in a structurally estimated general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and long-term defaultable corporate bonds. Before the first disaster, lenders cannot distinguish resilient from exposed firms, and both borrow at the same credit spread. A realized disaster resolves about 34% of the uncertainty about a firm's exposure, and credit spreads price it, so exposed firms pay 14 basis points more than resilient firms. Firms do not internalize the cost of aggregate credit growth, which raises the disaster probability, so credit expands again after every disaster. A mild leverage cap lowers credit spreads by 10 basis points and the default rate by 26% and raises welfare by 5.9%, while tighter caps and permanent issuance taxes lower welfare.
Presentations: University of Virginia; Baylor University; Cornell University; 7th Financial Economic Meeting FEM-2026 (Scheduled); 3rd LSU Finance Mardi Gras Conference (Scheduled); 18th Annual Hedge Fund Research Conference (Scheduled)
Full abstract
Stock-level information produced by many active managers can aggregate into a public signal about the overall market, while slow-moving capital can delay its incorporation into the index. We show that the daily returns of stocks heavily held by active managers relative to those held lightly positively predict next-day S&P 500 futures and ETF returns. The predictability is concentrated among hedge funds and high-active mutual funds, survives controls for risk premia and non-informational trading, is strongest in stocks with intense informed trading and many active holders, strengthens in high-uncertainty states, persists longer when intermediary capital is scarce or funding is tight, extends to global equity markets, and yields market-timing strategies with Sharpe ratios near one. A theory of specialized informed managers and slow-moving index capital reconciles these findings and delivers new mechanisms of information aggregation. Structural estimation attributes about 20% of the variation in stock-level payoff news to market-wide information, of which the index absorbs about 60% on the first day and the rest only gradually.
Investors can influence firms only through what outsiders can measure. We present a simple model in which sustainable demand creates a pricing wedge, but the firm chooses both a costly internal social action and the precision of disclosure about it. When disclosure is too noisy or too costly, the wedge does not translate into real action. We test this prediction using confidential U.S. Census administrative wage records to measure firm-year employee gender pay gaps. With rich fixed effects, socially responsible ownership is unrelated to pay gaps. The relation turns more negative when boards include female directors, and these firms talk more about gender equality in earnings calls. Our results suggest that information asymmetry limits investors’ ability to change hard-to-observe internal policies.
From Liberty Street to Main Street: The Fed's MBS Purchases and Local House Prices
We study how local house price growth responds to unconventional monetary policy. Motivated by aggregate evidence on mortgage rates and house prices, we develop a two-period general equilibrium model to illustrate a financing mechanism and guide our exposure measure and empirical comparisons using census tracts within the same county. Following larger Federal Reserve net purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities, house prices grow faster in tracts with greater pre-existing reliance on agency finance. Relative to the reinvestment years, the growth gap widens during pandemic-era purchases and narrows during subsequent runoff, even after controls. Runoff was much smaller than purchases and coincided with conventional tightening, so the narrowing cannot be attributed to runoff alone. Taken together, these findings suggest that asset purchases may intensify local affordability pressures, while slower house price growth during runoff \mbox{does not necessarily reverse those pressures.